driven by a weaker version of the Aristotelian archetype citizen and diluted civic-republicanism.
There are still some troubling features in this civic idea. Beiner sometimes suggests that people can move from nationalist to civic identities fairly easily, and that this is desirable. In the case of many Aboriginal nations this is simply not true; nationhood is employed as a resistance strategy to assimilation, as a way to make social and economic claims, and as a necessary feature of the decolonization process. Beiner also argues that the politics of ethnicity offends the civic idea, but without adequately considering that it is not simply that ethnic groups self-ascribe to nationalist (or even non-nationalist) identities but rather that identification is also externally imposed as an effect of racialization.
Though the book does not ultimately supply a radical theory of citizenship, it does make a valuable contribution to critiques of liberalism and nationalism as well as theories of citizenship and community. The analysis is contextualized, nuanced, well-organized, and showered with lively links between theory and practice. It presents a skilful overview of contemporary debates by addressing some of the most important and difficult questions of citizenship and community, and persuasively resituates the concept of citizenship. It is a useful and relevant book for students of politics and political theory. This collection commemorates and continues the work of James Doull, who died in 2001 after a long career in classics at Dalhousie University. With an evident command of ancient and medieval intellectual culture, but also with a considerable grasp of the history of Western philosophy in general, which he read as a Hegelian, Doull sought a philosophy of history that would make explicit what is essential in what we are becoming today. Throughout, the question of freedom fundamental for the human guided his investigations.
An inspiring preface by Graeme Nicholson, and a helpful general introduction by Peddle and Robertson, former students of Doull, prepare the way. The principal contributor is Doull himself, from whom we have a brief opening lecture which surveys the history of Western thought, followed by nine investigations of its particular stages, with each investigation being followed by one or two commentaries by scholars influenced by Doull.
Greek drama and philosophy, Plato's Parmenides, Virgil's Rome, and the legacies of Augustine and Neoplatonism are the subjects of Doull's first xxxxxxxx five investigations. If in the beginning we lived as animals dominated by natural forces especially by our own physiological inclinations Judaism would liberate us from nature by comprehending both the wholly transcendent principle of all things, and the human as a fallen image of that principle. Although Plato provided the adequate expression of that transcendence (tragically beyond us), Greek religion cast divinities in roles which imitated merely finite beings (somewhat comically). Ultimately, a unity of transcendence and finitude would come to pass beyond the limits of Neoplatonic theory and Roman practice in 'Christ,' 'the full and adequate revelation of the God who ... knows all that is different from himself as himself.' This logos, presaged by Aristotle, and culminating in Augustine, would become the logic of Hegel: that the infinity of free rational thought (or the Word) does not transcend the finitude of natural inclination (or the flesh) by opposing it as an ontological other, for that would leave the finite equally opposed to the infinite, rendering the latter finite; rather, the infinite transcends the finite by accommodating it within itself as one moment of its unopposed infinity. Thus, the concretely free life requires reason in the state to accommodate inclination (expressed by the interests of individuals and groups) in civil society.
Two of Doull's investigations interpret Hegel including a very interesting debate with Emil Fackenheim on the twentieth century. Then comes Doull's critical investigation of Heidegger on freedom and the state, matched by a lucid response from Nicholson. The final investigation turns directly to contemporary political institutions. If Christianity understood every individual to be rational freedom incarnate, modernity would become the social and political project of actualizing that freedom for all. Today, however, subjective freedom recites a measureless litany of petitions to which we respond with a fidelity we no longer understand, demanding right after right in a world in which 'I think, therefore I am' has been eclipsed by 'I have interests, therefore I have rights.' Because we misunderstand our freedom as merely opposed to past institutions, the stages of its development, which could help us accommodate it within reason, have been lost. Europe's early twentieth-century afflictions manifest the nation state's political incapacity to transcend (in the Christian-Hegelian sense, by accommodating, not in the totalitarian sense, by opposing) a politics of mere interests. A country like Canada, founded as a federation of multiple nations and regions rather than as a traditional nation state, may contain within itself sufficient distinction between particular interests on the one hand, and a state universality able to accommodate rationally those interests on the other, such that a rational freedom may take hold in it. Ultimately, Philosophy and Freedom aims to realize an adequate comprehension of that very possibility. And although its argumentation can be very challenging, and the sheer number of historical texts it discusses overwhelming, its authors most of whose contributions exceed what can be discussed here deserve our thanks for continuing to take both freedom and the history of Western thought as seriously as James Doull did. (JOHN DUNCAN This volume of essays and replies focuses mainly on that part of Burge's work known as 'anti-individualism.' A volume so focused should not be thought narrow, however, as both the roots and branches of these insights are extensive. For example, Calvin Normore's 'Burge, Descartes and Us,' ranges from Descartes's thought experiments, to the picture of natural kind terms emerging from Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity. Normore ranges broadly to provoke Burge's response to what he sees as a central tension:
'[H]ow to preserve the insight that the reference of a thinker's thoughts and words is wholly fixed by relations, usually causal relations, to a world outside the thinker (and so dependent on that world) and at the same time preserve the strong intuition that some concepts and most, perhaps all, perceptual states could misrepresent the very things they represent.' Normore's paper highlights the importance of distinguishing among linguistic terms, concepts, and percepts with respect to their content, causal relations, and representational aspects, when considering arguments for or against anti-individualism, first-person authority, and scepticism. Burge's response underscores this with subtle explanations of why he rejects several theses sometimes associated with 'externalist' positions, among them that 'mental representation or reference is never representation-as.' Burge's rejection includes a detailed theory of conceptual and perceptual representation and the way representations are both 'perspectival' and necessarily dependent on their external relations for individuation. Burge's reply also includes a reappraisal of Descartes, and those who find themselves teaching Descartes's Meditations with Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and Burge in mind (or vice versa) will find the Normore-Burge exchange clarifying. Also to this end, Keith Donnellan's paper and Burge's reply help to clarify the differences in scope, methodology, and conclusions between Putnam's thought experiments and Burge's. Those interested in the possible role of anti-individualist considerations in a defense against scepticism will find an enlightening exchange of well-considered views in Barry Stroud's contribution and Burge's reply.
Christopher Peacocke's 'Implicit Conceptions, Understanding, and Rationality' introduces the notion of an 'implicit conception' by asking: What goes on when someone reflects on and comes to appreciate an axiom or rule of inference as valid? Peacocke advocates the importance of 'implicit
